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Abstract: The materialism controversy, which tore 
the middle 19th century intellectual German society apart, 
involved scientists, theologians, philosophers, teachers, 
and even more. Hermann Lotze, who at first was not will-
ing to engage in this dispute, was soon appealed to as an 
arbiter based upon his previous epistemological writings 
concerning life sciences, psychology and natural science 
in general. Since he appeared to defend both a mecha-
nistic point of view in natural science and spiritualism in 
metaphysics, representatives of both these extreme posi-
tions thought he could help backing up their own views 
during the controversy. Yet, as Lotze himself described it, 
the controversy was for his times, generally speaking, 
only “useless torture”. This paper aims at showing that 
Lotze’s specific role in the controversy corresponds to 
what we will assume to be a clear theoretical need of the 
time: i.e., a critical assessment of how to connect natural 
science with metaphysics. 
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Introduction 
 
From today’s perspective, the “materialism controversy” 
could easily look like a forgotten moment in German and 
European intellectual life, and having forgotten it we can 
easily convince ourselves that its role had only been a mi-
nor one. Yet, such reasoning reverses the cause and its 
consequences, as is clear from the already existing studies 
on the “Materialismusstreit”1. Historical inquiry based on 
contemporary accounts confirms the view that the materi-
alism controversy was—with regard to its length, extent, 
as well as intellectual impact—“one of the most important 
intellectual disputes of the second half of the nineteenth 
century”.2 As an anonymous account puts it, the “idols of 
materialism” were the “true golden calf of this century3”, 
or, as a more neutral assessment would say, materialism 
had become at that time a “total social phenomenon”, the 
critical and polemical reactions being commensurate with 
its effective impact. 
More exactly, what needs to be considered is the de-
termining influence of science as a total social fact: it is 
characteristic of the materialism of that time that it ev-
olved into a “scientific materialism”4. In its final phase, 
the “materialism controversy” partly merges with the 
“Darwin controversy”5, yet we must not confuse the two: 
the former significantly pre-dates the latter and has its 
own characteristics. From the 1840s, a fundamental di-
vide emerges among natural scientists about what it 
means to explain natural, and especially vital, phenom-
ena6—and the crisis erupts in September 1854 on the oc-
casion of an institutional event for the German scientific 
community: the 31st meeting of the Congress of German 
Naturalists and Physicians (Gesellschaft deutscher Natur-
forscher und Ärtze) in Göttingen. 
In 1856, when the controversy is at its height, Lotze 
describes it as having proved to be “useless torture”7: it 
has trapped us between a kind of positivism willfully 
blind to anything but facts and what spiritualists take to 
be an approach that, by adhering to a position based on 
faith, it stays beyond any possible proof or refutation. 
In his book Late German Idealism: Lotze and Trende-
lenburg, Frederick Beiser relates how Lotze tried, in vain, 
not to get personally involved in the controversy, whereas 
main protagonists from both sides were asking him to do 
so—sometimes in a rather intrusive or even provocative 
manner.8 For instance, he never escaped the cruel nick-
name given to him by Carl Vogt in one of the central con-
troversy texts: among the champions of a “metaphysical 
physiology” of “substantial soul” in Göttingen, Rudolph 
Wagner (director of the Physiology Institute) is referred 
to as the “mystical believer”, and Lotze as the “specula-
tive Struwwelpeter”9. This reference to the well-known 
character of German children’s literature suggests that, 
though Lotze’s philosophy of science and nature appears 
to be an impartial and original one, it is in fact waving a 
red flag in an attempt to frighten people away from any-
thing that could go against the bourgeois moral order. 
With this nickname, Vogt puts Lotze on the same level as 
Wagner, both seeking to infantilize society by appealing 
to “superstitions” such as “soul” and “freedom”. From 
Vogt’s perspective, one could say that the former’s spiri-
tualism very opportunely provides the theoretical backing 
to the latter’s ultra-conservatism.10 In addition, Wagner 
tries to elicit support from his former protégé,11 for exam-
ple by showing particular indelicacy during the inaugural 
plenary conference of the 1854 conference mentioned 
above (the event that triggered a considerable controversy 
and marked the beginning of the crisis). In his very con-
troversial talk, Wagner does not name Lotze directly, but 
still refers to him as “this quick-witted scientist who sits 
here among us”, and then recalls the following excerpt 
from Lotze’s Medical Psychology: 
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The great extension that these materialistic reasonings have won 
in the progressive decline of general education, and surely will 
continue to win, requires us, without the hope of meaningful 
success, to test out their salient arguments.12 
 
I shall return to this passage later in my conclusion. It is 
out of question that Lotze did issue polemical statements 
against materialism. In his Medical Psychology, for ex-
ample, in addition to discussing several passages from 
Vogt’s first popular work, the Physiological Letters, he 
even makes a very cutting remark against the author (who 
will later not hesitate to make several references to it): 
  
‘As the function of the muscles is contraction, as that of the kid-
neys is to secrete urine, in the same way the brain conceives 
thoughts, strivings, feelings’. I doubt whether all the thoughts of 
men should arise in this uropoetic way; only this expression it-
self could lead us to the suspicion that it is possible.13 
 
Nevertheless, Wagner and Lotze do not take issue with 
materialism in the same way. Lotze, in particular, clearly 
distances himself from the principle of “double-entry 
bookkeeping” to which Wagner appeals in order to make 
a de jure separation between , on the one hand, issues and 
answers related to scientific knowledge and, on the other 
hand, those related to religious belief when dealing with 
contentious questions such as the creation of humanity or 
the existence of the soul. He also rejects Wagner’s thesis 
of the “divisibility of soul”14. Heinrich Czolbe, who wrote 
in 1855 an influential text on sensualism and materialism, 
confessed that Lotze’s anti-vitalist stance heavily influ-
enced him and, in so doing, he suggested that if Lotze had 
been consistent with this anti-vitalist approach, he himself 
would have joined the materialist stance!15 As for Vogt, 
once the controversy had begun, he denounced Lotze as 
Wagner’s henchman.16 Accordingly, we can easily under-
stand Lotze’s scientific despair and personal despondency 
due to his being held hostage by both sides in a contro-
versy he wished to avoid. 
The materialism controversy, however, had such a 
great impact that Frederick Beiser can state that “it was 
this debate that, for better or worse, gave [Lotze] his place 
in German intellectual history”17—a judgement we could 
subscribe to when considering, as Beiser does, Lotze’s 
famous “anthropological” work: the three volumes of 
Microcosmos, which indeed had a great success in Eu-
rope. Conceived as a response to the irreconcilable claims 
raised by both materialists and spiritualists in the context 
of the “materialism controversy” 18, Microcosmos sets out 
to present to a broader readership an overall vision of 
human beings by considering their psycho-physical na-
ture, their achievements as both thinking beings and liv-
ing beings, and lastly their goals as spiritual beings. 
Nevertheless, we should remember that Lotze could have 
never participated in the controversy as an arbiter without 
his fellow scholars having already recognized him, based 
on his early writings, as the right person for the job.  
This being said, how is it possible that in 1854 Lotze 
came to occupy (even against his will) this peculiar posi-
tion in the “materialism controversy”?  
Starting with this question, I will proceed in two steps. 
In this first part I will present Lotze’s key ideas in his 
Medical Psychology (1852); I will also consider Seele and 
Seelenleben (a text published in Wagner’s encyclopedia 
of physiology in 1846)19 in order: 
- To show what Lotze’s earliest views were regarding 
the materialist approach; and 
- To discuss further how the materialists’ attempts to 
consider Lotze as an opponent or to gain him as an ally in 
the controversy finally resulted in some misinterpretations 
that he had fully anticipated. 
In this respect, my aim here is to show how Lotze’s 
criticism of the materialist thinkers of his time focuses on 
epistemological issues. This will lead me, in the second 
part, to address Lotze’s claims from the perspective of a 
topic that proves decisive in his overall philosophical 
work: i.e., the connection between metaphysics and natu-
ral science. On his account, neither materialists nor spiri-
tualists carried out a frank and rigorous critical assess-
ment of this matter, as should they have done given the 
issues at stake in the “materialism controversy”. That 
such an enquiry is absolutely necessary for Lotze will turn 
out to be a key element in the interpretation of the sen-
tence I quoted above: if the “materialism controversy” is 
“useless torture”, it is to the extent that “we inflict [it] on 
ourselves through premature interruption of the investiga-
tion”20. This “premature interruption” would now there-
fore mean ignoring the issue of how to connect natural 
science with metaphysics. 
We could refer here to a remark by Reinhardt Pester 
and offer a justification of it in this perspective: according 
to Lotze, the materialism controversy remained unfruitful 
precisely because the main protagonists turned out to lack 
any sense of “the necessity for a division of labor”21 be-
tween philosophy and natural science. Here we will have 
to elaborate on what this “division of labor” exactly 
means, because the metaphor itself can be misleading. As 
with the debate with Wagner about the relations between 
faith and science, Lotze firmly rejects the idea of using 
“double-entry bookkeeping” (doppelte Buchhaltung) in 
regard to metaphysics and natural science, i.e., the idea of 
considering certain common issues from two separate 
perspectives. According to him, this would amount to le-
gitimating a partition and no longer just a distribution of 
tasks when dealing with theoretical issues related to na-
ture, especially those that concern the relationship be-
tween soul and body. My aim is to show that the option 
defended by Lotze consists in a “progressive” connec-
tion—similar to the way he combines two directions in 
his own metaphysical system. In the end, what he 
achieves by elaborating on the need to clarify the relation-
ship between metaphysics and natural science will shed 
light on the philosophical meaning of his own ideal-
realist approach. 
 
 
1. The epistemological critique of materialism 
 
In 1854, the protagonists of the materialism controversy 
were familiar with Lotze’s anti-materialistic views. With 
his critique of “vital force”, these had been a common 
thread running through his writings until then, which were 
devoted to medicine (pathology and physiology: 1842, 
1851), psychology, and their philosophical basis.22 On 
Lotze’s account, if materialists as well as spiritualists dis-
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torted what he wrote in order to present his thoughts as 
theirs, the cause was of methodological nature. 
 
 
1.1. The desire for unity and its epistemological cri-
tique 
 
It is interesting here to consider how Lotze structures the 
first chapter of his Medical Psychology, for there he out-
lines and describes an error which is shared by the two 
opposite positions he rejects. Both materialism and “iden-
tity-philosophies” lead to the “identification of body and 
soul”23. No matter how different the two positions are, 
both are tempted to yield to an excessive desire for unity 
in explaining the world. According to Lotze, such a desire 
can be methodologically misleading, this is why he 
speaks of a “yearning for the unity of the world”24. 
 
Behind every objection generally raised against separating the 
soul from the body as a characteristic principle, one finds […] 
an anxious dread of the formal mistake of the ambivalence that 
is justified by it between the spiritual and the corporeal in the 
world in general. […] Longing for the unity of the world exer-
cises such a great violence, that any attempt to distinguish both 
of the kingdoms of being within it will be feared as the most 
inadmissible depravation of the entire world-view.25 
 
This applies perfectly to materialism: what it claims in 
this respect amounting to the ”total sacrifice of an au-
tonomous spiritual being” in the name of ”the much 
longed-for unity of the world”26.  
Why does Lotze think that the “yearning for unity” 
misses the point, thereby becoming “misleading” or 
“false” (falsch)? In both materialism and identity-
philosophy, he notes, the unity is meant to apply to “phe-
nomena” and their substrata, not to the ruling “principles” 
of natural science itself. 
  
Science absolutely does not have in general a particular obliga-
tion to work towards the unity [of a principle of appearances], 
but only in relation to the directions in which a commonality not 
only of the final but also of the nearest foundation for a group of 
appearances is necessary or probable from higher and more gen-
eral grounds. […]  
We have grounds for supposing that all natural events are based 
on the same laws of statics and mechanics, but not the least 
grounds to suspect that everywhere there will be the same forces 
and substances that work according to these rules. […] 
We must therefore demand unity of the highest laws, since the 
connection of the world to a rational whole is an indispensable 
precondition of our spirit; we can demand a unity of the nearer 
laws or of the substrata upon which these effects rest in only if a 
series of particular analogies made it likely; we must suppose 
the difference of the same substrata as soon as the divergence of 
all appearances so imperiously demands it, as in the case of our 
spiritual life. 27 
 
It might be relevant here to draw a parallel between this 
passage and the Appendix to the transcendental Dialectic 
in the Critique of Pure Reason, where reason aims at 
forming the “systematic whole of knowledge”, and this 
“systematic unity” is indeed to be looked for at the level 
of principles, not at the level of the objects of know-
ledge.28 The principles of the systematic unity of the use 
of the understanding settle “lines of direction” along 
which “all its rules converge at one point, which […] is 
only an idea (focus imaginarius) – i.e., a point from which 
the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed”, 
so that this also results in “the deception, as if these lines 
of direction were shot out from an object lying outside the 
field of possible empirical cognition”29. Scientists who try 
to find a “misleading unity” and turn a unique substance 
into a methodological and epistemological principle are 
precisely under this illusion, and end up mistaking ‘ob-
jects’ for ‘principles’30. 
From this perspective, Lotze’s critique of materialism 
(as well as of identity-philosophies) is indeed a method-
ological one: his demand being that on these subjects we 
do not settle for the “fading form of a general method-
ological demand of any scientific investigation”, which 
characterizes those thinkers who naively follow their de-
sire to reach “as much unity as possible” but, at the same 
time, fail to take on the epistemological task that enables 
us to distinguish the elements in (or the structure of) what 
is properly a science. 
 
 
1.2 Materialism and naturalism 
 
Still in the same text, the methodological and epistemo-
logical critique of materialism reveals a second essential 
aspect: the materialism that Lotze is confronting at that 
time is a naturalistic one. Lotze first defines it (a), then he 
critically assesses the very nature of this “enthusiasm for 
natural science” and immediately denounces it as “mis-
leading” (“missverständlich”) (b). 
(a) According to the way in which § 3 (dedicated to 
the “objections of materialists” in the Medical Psychol-
ogy) begins, materialist systems 
 
have appeared again and again in all times, but […] the sudden 
progress of the natural sciences has particularly emboldened 
[them], in the most recent times, to come forward with ever 
greater extension and with growing confidence.31 
 
To what does this lead? Lotze argues that: “It is necessary 
for these theories not only to avoid the existence of a psy-
chical principle of its own” (according to the broad defini-
tion of materialism), “but also, above all, to entirely ab-
sorb psychology into natural science.32” As is charac-
terized by Kurt Bayertz in several of his texts, this mod-
ern form of materialism can be defined as a naturalistic 
materialism.33 
(b) While materialists show enthusiasm for what they 
hold as “a truly magnificent circle of scientific educa-
tion”, Lotze takes it to be “completely false” (“überaus 
falsche Begeisterung”)34. Let us ask ourselves why, for 
this clearly represents a common thread in this section 
devoted to the “materialists’ objections”.35 In what ex-
actly does the “falsity” consist? I will examine three pas-
sages, and try to bring them together with additional criti-
cal comments. 
(1) First of all, if one agrees with Lotze that the expla-
natory power of science is, as one might put it, only a 
prospective one, then one could say that materialism uses 
a “strange methodology”:  
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[The] tactic [of the materialists] consists simply in referring to 
an unsighted clutter of facts, whose unclarity is supposed to a 
certain extent to guarantee for us that it conceals within it yet a 
great deal of information, while nevertheless the impossibility of 
that which we hope to find in it allows itself to be established at 
the outset. If anyone supposes that it is impossible that a steam 
engine without a conductor should choose its routes and should 
at determined times travel now here and now there, someone 
else could with equal justification be surprised by the naive 
audacity of this claim, and could respond to him that he should 
investigate the whole collection of wheels, pistons, balances, 
nails, and screws; could there still be in this fullness and this 
manifold of tools a great deal that we certainly still do not 
understand how to trace back to determinate mechanical princi-
ples? We will thus decline this well-meaning invitation to fol-
low modern neurophysiology in all of its dreams, and we must 
rather presuppose a definite conviction concerning that which is 
physically possible or impossible, in order to avoid the unneces-
sary detours of science.36 
 
When materialism presupposes, as a starting point, an 
overall explanatory power of physiology with regard to 
psychic phenomena, it somehow manages to put natural 
science in the paradoxical and questionable position of 
becoming a new “sanctuary of ignorance”37: there is no 
need to reconsider the principles that are behind what we 
cannot explain today, because we know we will be able to 
explain it tomorrow. Lotze’s critique appears to reach far 
beyond the immediate scope of his time and to target an 
easy option that could well prove to be sophistical and 
that is usually found in scientist approaches—no matter 
what they are, and whether acknowledged as such or only 
latent. In 19th century society, the rise of materialism 
somehow corresponds to a “transfer of powers” from reli-
gion to natural science: to some extent, and according to 
certain people, science began to replace religion as a 
social authority.38 Must this mean that the function of a 
“sanctuary of ignorance”, too, may begin to shift from the 
one to the other?  
(2) Above all, Lotze bases his own spiritualism upon a 
principle that he will always remain faithful to, and which 
concerns the phenomenal order, i.e., an immediate intu-
ition of physical and psychic phenomena as being abso-
lutely irreducible to one another.39 This thesis represents 
one of the three “facts of consciousness” (along with the 
“unity of consciousness” and the “consciousness of free-
dom”) upon which Lotze grounds his discussion of the 
idea of a spiritual substance and its necessity. Should we 
accept a substance dualism beyond this dualism at the 
level of phenomena?40 In this respect, it must be noticed 
that at the very beginning of his 1846 article “Soul and 
mental life”, Lotze shows a philosophical allegiance to 
Descartes’ claim about “the total impossibility of compar-
ing thinking and extension” by considering it as “the first 
decisive beginnings of scientific psychology”41. In his 
Medical Psychology, Lotze regularly refers to the princi-
ple of a “chasm that opens up” between “both circles of 
events”42. Accordingly, “falseness” in the materialist and 
naturalist’s “scientific enthusiasm” also consists in ex-
tending, whether deliberately or not, this sophism of a 
“μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος” from one order of phenom-
ena to the other: 
  
If the demand for a preservation of the fundamental principles of 
natural science, which we now repeatedly find in the introduc-
tion of nearly every newly appearing work of a certain general 
tendency, only had the intention to recommend these most gen-
eral rules of all judgment, [and] logical and methodical preci-
sion, which natural science has to thank for the relative surety of 
its progress, we would embrace it without hesitation. Yet it 
mostly has rather another meaning, that of wishing to elevate the 
concrete laws of an unensouled nature, indeed the substrate and 
powers themselves that are at work there, into generally valid 
principles of all investigation, and into means of explanation 
that are everywhere applicable.43 
 
To the difference between these two orders of phenomena 
corresponds, then, a difference between two explanatory 
principles, and this brings us back to what we drew atten-
tion to in the previous section (see p. 92, notably the quo-
tation)44. 
This methodological issue is a constant element in 
Lotze’s overall critique of materialism. We find it again, 
for instance, in the 1859 review of a book by Karl Snell—
and this time during the controversy: 
  
The usual materialism […] places […] itself far beyond the 
question how in principle this μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, the 
transformation of the final mechanical elements of motion into 
the first psychical element of thought, is possible.45 
 
Even when people try to speculate on such point, as Snell 
does (though he does not share the materialist contention), 
they all share the same limit, which thus remains essen-
tially unclear: again, it is “in some unproveable way that 
here the physical is supposed to be transposed into the 
psychical”46.  
At a minimal level, materialists put forward a “fading 
form of a general methodological demand of any scien-
tific investigation while demanding unity regarding the 
explanatory principles of phenomena, and thereby then 
end up “homogenizing” the phenomena themselves. On 
the contrary, in his Medical Psychology, Lotze presents us 
with the logical and methodological possibility of 
dualism.47 In the second part of the paper, I will focus on 
how he finally argues in favor of the spiritualist position. 
But for now the important point is to stress how he op-
poses the materialists’ claim to the effect that their con-
tention is, methodologically speaking, a perfectly valid 
one: “Should we now not truly guess the secret of their 
reconcilability, it is nevertheless certain that still less will 
that person come to terms with the appearances, who does 
not know at all the evident secret of their separability”48. 
(3) At a minimal level, the key assumptions of both 
spiritualism and materialism can be identified with the 
two claims of substantial soul and of matter as substantial 
reality respectively. 
But even these minimal definitional assumptions re-
veal an asymmetry, or at least an illusory one. The claim 
of a substantial soul taken as a theoretical principle is not 
observation-based, i.e., it cannot be directly inferred from 
the phenomena, whereas common sense and most materi-
alists make the opposite claim about matter.49 Materialism 
is often combined with an empiricist approach (some-
times even a radical one), and their mistake can be de-
scribed as follows. They claim methodological superi-
ority, based upon the conviction that the concept of matter 
possesses immediate clarity. This is why Lotze plays his 
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trump card in the controversy by challenging this alleged 
immediate clarity of the concept of matter.50 
 
Is it then an agreed-upon fact, prior to all other investigations, 
that all of the intuitions of the most general sensual experience, 
the concepts of matter, the assumptions concerning the manner 
in which forces work, as they have gradually been built up in 
physics in the course of time from analogies, hypotheses, and 
suspicions, of which most have not been able to be theoretically 
confirmed-- is it certain, that all of this is gospel […]?.51 
 
In this respect, Lotze’s rejection of the principles of ma-
terialism goes far beyond occasional clarifications. Let us 
have a look into Microcosmos, the great work that will 
keep Lotze busy for the next decade. In the first volume 
Lotze essentially aims at making a large audience aware 
that scientific basic concepts need clarification. It turns 
out that materialists employ such concepts, at best, in a 
naive way by simply assuming that they possess immedi-
ate clarity. Or, second option, they neglect this issue con-
sciously and just try to cover epistemological deficiencies 
by rhetorical means, due to the fact that, compared with 
their real aims that are of practical nature, this point is of 
no real importance to them. The first chapters of Micro-
cosmos provide such clarification in a way that is both 
systematic (in terms of scope) and “popular” (albeit de-
manding in the way in which it is presented).52  
Such clarification is especially needed when it comes 
to the concept of matter. At the time of the materialism 
controversy, atomism, too, was a very debated topic 
among both natural scientists and philosophers. This led 
to a general critical assessment of what matter genuinely 
is, and of what philosophy should borrow from the latest 
physicalist assumptions in this regard—or how it could 
stand critically in relation to this scientific background.53 
In particular, in 1855 Lotze published a detailed review of 
Fechner’s On the physical and philosophical doctrine of 
atoms.54 But already in his earlier Medical Psychology, 
even if he was not striving for an overall clarification of 
the idea of matter yet, at least he intended to show how 
deceptive it would be to assume immediate clarity here, 
as was usual. 
Therefore: 
  
[...] we must withdraw, from the false enthusiasm for the exact-
ness of natural-scientific representations, their ultimate ground, 
by means of the recollection that matter itself is by no means a 
given and fixed principle, nor an object of perception, but only 
the creation of a very arbitrary hypothesis.55  
 
In fact the concept of matter has a form of clarity, but ac-
cording to Lotze, we should become aware that this is 
only a pragmatic clarity. The words he uses in the rel-
evant passage are interesting because they seem to convey 
a pragmatist view of natural science. Lotze clearly distin-
guishes it from the perspective of metaphysical know-
ledge (even if it the latter still represents the ultimate end 
of the former): 
 
The natural sciences have developed a tremendous number of 
perceptions of an external sort regarding the appearance of mat-
ter. […] Thus the representation of it becomes such a familiar 
one, such a practically applicable one, and within the usual 
circle of natural-scientific reflections it leads so adequately to 
the right results, that the uncritical confidence, with which 
common opinion everywhere makes use of it, cannot disconcert 
us. But as no one in daily life doubts the value and utility of the 
gold coins we use–though upon closer consideration many peo-
ple prove to have very confused representations of the origin 
and location of this value [“Wert”]–so too does matter become 
ever more obscure to us when we don’t consider its value in the 
calculations [“Rechnungswert”] of physical mechanics, and ask 
what it might indeed be in itself.56 
 
From this perspective, insofar as natural science is based 
on the concept of matter, it ”lays down a completely bo-
gus principle, in itself false, as its foundation, but never-
theless, through an ingenious combination of other sour-
ces of assistance, it understands how to make it very use-
ful for a great number of investigations”57. As for the con-
cept of matter, Lotze very often goes into detail when dis-
cussing physicalist and chemical models of his time.58 
Accordingly, when it comes to clarifying the primary 
concepts of natural science we must not separate philoso-
phy from scientific discussion. Now, in order not to mis-
understand Lotze’s idealism, we should always keep in 
mind his twofold assumption about matter: if from the 
point of view of a scientific theory of nature “matter” 
should be considered as an “arbitrary assumption”, from 
the metaphysical standpoint it is assumed to be a “being”, 
though a “secondary” one (in comparison to the spirit).59 
If matter has no essential clarity, then the same holds 
for interactions between material entities. Contrary to an-
other frequent methodological assumption on the part of 
materialists, “the working of matter upon matter, which 
we usually embrace as clear and obvious, suffers compre-
hensively from the very inconceivability, which we treat, 
entirely in error, as a particular mistake in the assumption 
of an interaction between body and soul” 60. Such a claim 
made by Lotze undermines the approach of a materialist-
based naturalistic psychology such as that of Heinrich 
Czolbe. 
In his successive replies to those who discuss his writ-
ings on this issue, Lotze shows how tired he is of seeing 
his methodological and epistemological warnings simply 
being ignored.61 In his view, they represent the heart of 
the debate as well as the only solid basis able to provide a 
common ground for discussion. It is worth noting that, 
when facing such opponents, Lotze also adopts an epis-
temological stance with respect to the problem of the 
soul: i.e., he considers it as an assumption. According to 
Lotze, this assumption is actually required to explain a 
central observational fact which lies at the very basis of 
psychology as the science of psychic activity: unity of 
consciousness. This issue is a common thread in his dis-
cussion with Heinrich Czolbe.62 In his Medical Psychol-
ogy Lotze had already stressed the “unity of conscious-
ness” as one of the three facts of consciousness, which he 
then considered as “grounds of the formation of the con-
cept of soul.”63 For him, this will become a cornerstone in 
the materialism controversy: 
 
until materialism takes this totally uneliminable fact into con-
sideration, we will be unable to believe that it has succeeded in 
refuting its opponents.64 
 
Besides, “we would find an area conducive to debate” 
only if materialism was able to clarify what this phenom-
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enal “unity” of our representations is and what the “unity 
of all experiences” means65. The kind of materialism that 
Lotze is facing there (in this case Czolbe’s, but we could 
certainly find other examples) actually intends to account 
for the psychic activity of consciousness, and claims to do 
so by considering brain states and how neural pathways 
are anatomically “centralized” in the brain. But Lotze 
emphasizes, once again, that movement and spatial phe-
nomena, on the one hand, and psychic phenomena, on the 
other hand, have nothing in common; this time he goes a 
step further by bringing psychic phenomenon back to the 
unity of consciousness. States of mind are not only mental 
states: they are mental states referred to the representation 
of an “ego”, of ”the ego as one” (“dem einen Ich”)66. It is 
very interesting to see how Lotze develops here what 
proves to be a Kantian line of reasoning67, although he 
will always carefully avoid any use of Kant’s “transcen-
dental” vocabulary. This “old issue of the possible unity 
in consciousness” is referred to the “unity of all experi-
ences”, and what Lotze calls “thought” (Denken68) stands 
for an act of “inner connection (Zusammenhang) of the 
manifold”69. “Thinking consists not only in a hunt for im-
ages, not in a succession of representations, which are 
only intuitively attached to or separated from one an-
other”: “So we need […] a subject that in the unity of its 
consciousness not only unites, and at the same time keeps 
separate, both of the elements of comparison, but that is 
also conscious of the nature and dimension of its own 
movement in the transition from the one to the other”.70  
I will not discuss further this implicit presence of 
Kant’s thought here—it would turn out to be quite a com-
plex issue if we also considered Lotze’s (at least apparent) 
claim of a “substantial” soul as a basis of this very unity 
of consciousness.71 Here my aim was simply to show, in 
accord with my general purpose in this first part, how 
Lotze points to a series of epistemological problems in-
volved in what materialists claim: though quite paradoxi-
cal, both the “Kantian” line of reasoning and the (appar-
ent) claim of substantial soul have here primarily this 
function. In his critique of sensualism, Lotze rejects what 
one could call “intuitivism” based on an aprioristic claim 
as regards to knowledge—even if he uses other terms for 
it.72 At the same time, Lotze reproaches Czolbe for mix-
ing up elements pertaining to theory of knowledge (sen-
sualism) with those of metaphysics (materialism).73 As for 
the claim of substantial soul, it is here understood as an 
epistemological necessity on the basis of a psychic obser-
vational fact74: for this reason, rather than speaking of 
“substance”, we should rather speak of “substratum”, 
which would make the epistemological approach much 
more explicit. Against materialists, Lotze emphasizes that 
even physicists do not hesitate to introduce, hypotheti-
cally, such “substrata” both as principle and “support” of 
psychic phenomena. As Lotze says, this also applies to 
psychic phenomena: 
  
The passion with which we make natural science the prime an-
swer in the treatment of every question does not anyway prevent 
those who espouse it from acting completely against the analo-
gies and rules of this science in their reflections […] [Most of 
the time], due to an ambiguous parti-pris for physical intuition 
one does not at all provide oneself with the means by which this 
intuition itself obtains its results. When electrical and magnetic 
phenomena were first observed, when warmth and light began to 
become the object of investigation in a more exact way, one did 
not shy away from assuming, for the explanation of these phe-
nomena that are so divergent from the others, entirely specific 
substrata. Now we know of course how often, against these as-
sumptions, the objection of arbitrariness and multiplication of 
principles is made; nevertheless the mind is yet to come that will 
again be able to come by all of the results obtained along this 
path without such an assumption, only from the properties of 
ponderable bodies.75 
 
Taking a step back, we suggest that the idea of substance 
is used here as a category, even if Lotze does not express 
it that way; in doing so, we refrain from immediately in-
terpreting Lotze’s “substantialism” as a metaphysical op-
tion.76 In Kant’s table of categories, the relationship of 
inherence and subsistence is prior to the relationship of 
community or reciprocity, with causality between them. If 
we consider now what Lotze is trying to achieve in his 
scientific psychology, we must stress that his attempt to 
ground scientificity in the study of psychic causality relies 
on the concept of psycho-physical interaction (psycho-
physischen Wechselwirkungen). For Lotze, a scientific 
psychology is a “physiological psychology”, and conse-
quently interaction between psychic and physical has to 
be the key concept.77 But, to continue with our Kantian 
guiding thread here, this is a concept that we can frame 
only by using the category of interaction or community. 
Yet, if we assume this Kantian interpretation, then the 
conclusion is that, in order to build a scientific psychol-
ogy, we would need substance as a categorial idea, just as 
we need interaction and community. I would tend to see 
this as one of the possible reasons why the category of 
substance is then also used beyond what Kant himself al-
lowed in his first Critique regarding the notions of soul 
and psychic causality.78  
 
 
2. Connecting science and metaphysics: the sui generis 
answer of Lotze’s “ideal-realism” 
 
The aim of Part I was to provide us with the correct basis 
on which we can consider how natural science and meta-
physics are connected in Lotze’s thought, and how the 
issue of materialism played a part in his subsequent con-
ceptions. 
Reading the first chapter of Medical Psychology we 
can see how Lotze’s spiritualism comes into it in more 
than one way, or, rather, that there are two lines of rea-
soning in the use of the psychic principle, so that only the 
metaphysical line of reasoning deserves to be described as 
a form of “spiritualism”. Nevertheless, Lotze’s purpose is 
to connect these approaches, certainly not to confine each 
of them to a separate area. To that extent, we can defi-
nitely assert that spiritualism falls within the boundaries 
of Lotze’s science of psychology.  
Let us discuss dualism. Dualism means something en-
tirely different according to whether it is about phenom-
ena (psychic or physical ones) or about tracing them back 
to what sustains them metaphysically. Let us consider 
first the following question; based only on what we have 
argued so far, should we not expect Lotze to raise the 
claim of a body-soul/matter-spirit dualism? As we have 
already seen, dualism between physical and psychic phe-
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nomena turns out to be Lotze’s first epistemological prin-
ciple; and as far as psychic phenomena are concerned, we 
have also seen that Lotze’s line of reasoning is to refer 
phenomena to a substratum. Why, then, are physical phe-
nomena likewise not referred to a substratum—i.e., to a 
second substratum that would be independent of the first? 
To put it otherwise: why does Lotze not adopt a Cartesian 
form of metaphysics here?79 In the theoretical context of 
19th century physics/philosophical physics, matter would 
then replace extension as the required substance. In 
Lotze’s view, by contrast, spirit is “the original existence” 
(ursprüngliche Existenz), while matter is simply “a 
secondary being that cannot naturally have its roots any-
where else than in the spirit itself”80. At the beginning of 
the section on “spiritualist approaches” (with which Lotze 
explicitly sides), there is a remark that could help us find 
a better orientation in this problem. As Lotze himself pre-
sents his ideas while setting out the issue of materialism 
and anti-materialism in psychology: 
  
Up to this point we have granted independent reality to matter; 
we have satisfied ourselves with juxtaposing the soul to it as an 
equally independent but differently constituted reality. […] Al-
though in this we will preserve for individual investigations of 
psychology this manner of intuiting as the one that is alone 
clear and comfortable, we must still return here, for a moment, 
to the principles of the matter, in order to justify the applicable 
and transparent representations of a physico-psychical mecha-
nism as the abridged expression of  what is truly going on [“des 
wahren Verhaltens”].81 
 
On the one hand, Lotze acknowledges what I have just 
suggested: by taking into consideration only the epistemo-
logical approach that he sets out at the beginning of 
Medical Psychology, his account there could actually ac-
commodate not only dualist spiritualism but other meta-
physical options as well. On the other hand, what Lotze 
says at the end of this passage is crucial, because the con-
sideration of science as a pragmatic expression of meta-
physical truth implies a distinction between the respective 
statements. The final position Lotze is seeking is a subtle 
one insofar as, in spite of this distinction, he rejects the 
very idea of a “double entry bookkeeping” between sci-
ence and metaphysics. Prima facie we could easily think 
that science and metaphysics do not have any common 
claim. Yet, because of this rejection of a “double entry 
bookkeeping” we should rather say that science and 
metaphysics do not speak the same language: that science 
is an “abbreviation” (Abbreviatur) means that it can “say 
the same thing” as metaphysics, but this also presupposes 
that one is able to identify the connecting principle of 
both systems. According to Lotze, the aim of scientific 
knowledge in itself is to explore the interactions between 
natural elements from a mechanist point of view, and as 
such, it should be considered as the “abbreviation”, the 
“abridged expression” of a higher level. But this means 
that there is no true realism apart from this mechanist 
“expression” of interaction in nature.  
Soon after the passage we just commented upon, Lotze 
distinguishes between two modes of “our knowledge of 
things”, which he dubs cognitio rei and cognitio circa 
rem: indeed, this knowledge “in part concerns the funda-
mental nature of the object, in part the manifoldness of 
the relations that it can encounter externally”82. This is 
why the latter form of knowledge is relational and medi-
ate, whereas the former is intuitive and immediate.83 By 
introducing this distinction, Lotze aims to separate out 
two forms of knowledge respectively, construed as know-
ledge “of both the objects that concern us, matter and 
spirit”. Only the knowledge of spirit has intuitive clarity, 
whereas, as we have seen, the idea of matter has only a 
pragmatic clarity. When other authors will take over this 
distinction from Lotze, it is clearly with reference to this 
passage. Consequently, a connection is made to the two 
modes of knowledge matching natural science and human 
sciences respectively (and to that extent it intersects with 
Dilthey’s distinction: explanation/understanding (erklären 
/verstehen).84 The discussion, then, is still an epistemo-
logical one. If we examine this passage intertextually, 
with respect to the previous quotation (Mps, pp. 55-56) 
and the following one (which I will now discuss: Mps, pp. 
24-25), then we will see how it is all about making the 
transition from psychology to metaphysics. Knowledge 
circa rem, which corresponds to scientific activity as we 
currently understand it, is meant to be an “abridged ex-
pression of what is truly going on”. If we add the idea of 
the cognitio rei to this ontological plan in order to reach 
what “is truly going on”, then it turns out that the “princi-
ple” Lotze asks us to “return to” (cf. above, quotation 
from MPs, p. 57) is none other than spirit. Now a meta-
physical claim is raised in addition to the epistemological 
claim of a twofold knowledge, knowledge of spirit vs. 
knowledge of matter: this claim about the nature of reality 
thus happening to match spiritualism. This could already 
be inferred from the third passage from Lotze’s book we 
had to deal with above. As we should remember, when 
we first discussed the spiritualist approach (see MPs, p. 
55), we found Lotze asserting that “up to this point” he 
had been adhering to metaphysical neutrality (for such a 
neutrality is required when one has to confine oneself to 
the epistemic level). Now we can state that he was being 
inaccurate: §2 (“On true and false unity”) has already fur-
nished such a parallel view of metaphysics and science, 
which underscores their respective statements. 
 
And we do not doubt in the least, that, like all differences of be-
ing, so too that between body and soul has only a limited va-
lidity, and disappears in the unity of the hight ground of the 
world. Just as little do we wish to condemn attempts to investi-
gate more closely the manner of this confluence of appearances 
in this unity; but we cannot hope to achieve results soon enough 
and sound enough to be able to make them the foundation of our 
science, which to begin with has a different purpose. What is 
identical in its roots can grow apart in its branches. Now in the 
formation of a root the law of the angle may already be prefig-
ured, by which the boughs of a plant grow away from one an-
other. If we were to have at our disposal a botany that were to 
discern the relations of formation of the roots with such a sharp 
eye as to see this predestination, our knowledge of the branch-
ings would indeed attain to a completely different degree of cer-
tainty than the one it possesses. Should we presuppose a meta-
physics that is sharp and productive enough not only to grasp 
the truth of the concepts of the first elements, but also to make 
them fruitful, knowledge of the nature of a still unseparated ab-
solute would powerfully support us in the judgment of laws, in 
accordance with which the spiritual and corporeal worlds relate 
to one another following the separation of both of these 
branches. But what help is it to dream of things that do not ex-
ist? We are not at all at the beginning of things, not positioned at 
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the root of reality, but rather, with all of our reflections, we are 
sitting in its outermost branches, which tortuously entwine us. 
Nothing can remain to us but, first, to separate the branches that 
we encounter separately, and to follow each out as far as pos-
sible in its progress, in order to arrive at a hint of the direction in 
which it may melt together with the others in a common root. In 
satisfying this essential methodical demand [...], [never mind] 
how and where the spiritual and corporeal worlds might flow 
together, our investigation is valid only for the relations that 
prevail between the two of them where they do not coincide.85 
 
This excerpt is of paramount importance for the present 
issue. The metaphor of root and branches seems like a 
variation on Descartes’ “tree of philosophy”. In both 
cases we are provided with a systematic connection be-
tween metaphysics and physics, but these have different 
places: in Lotze, physics is not the trunk anymore, it has 
become one of the branches. A little further along in the 
text, Lotze presents us with the idea of a “general meta-
physical dynamics”, to which psychology and physics 
would be “subordinated” as two “branches”86. Kant, too, 
makes use of this metaphor in regard to the third principle 
with which “reason prepares the field for the understand-
ing”87 (“principles of systematic unity”88, “maxims of 
speculative reason”89): i.e. the “law of the affinity of all 
concepts”: 
 
The third law unites the first two, prescribing even in the case of 
the highest manifoldness a sameness of kind through the gradu-
ated transition from one species to others, which shows a kind of 
affinity of various branches, insofar as they have all sprouted 
from the one stem.90  
 
In Kant, this principle of affinity applies to the phenom-
enal field and to the understanding, which we use to ob-
tain any knowledge in this field—and in particular, scien-
tific knowledge (in fact, the problem which Kant is deal-
ing with here is how to classify phenomena into species): 
it is, therefore, an epistemological principle. In Lotze, if I 
try to apply this very same principle to both matter and 
spirit, insofar as one can wonder whether they are two 
distinct “fundamental genera” of being, then the principle 
shifts to a different register: that is, we are presented with 
this very shift from the scientific study of natural phe-
nomena, to metaphysics.91 
Consequently, Lotze’s approach to dualism cannot be 
dissociated from the problem of connecting science to 
metaphysics without subordinating either one to the other. 
The “branching”-metaphor clearly emphasizes the phe-
nomenal dualism of “physical” and “psychic” being 
paired with a metaphysical monism. At the same time, the 
possibility of a “physiological psychology” is becoming 
established. As with every science, it must proceed circa 
rem, and insofar as it concerns “the relationships between 
both worlds”, its reasoning must indeed be based on a 
dualist approach (psycho- vs. physical). Yet, metaphysi-
cally we would have to postulate a unity between both 
sides of being so as to make their interaction possible. 
The important point is that the interaction itself be inves-
tigated circa rem: psychology can become a scientific 
psychology as psycho-physics (with their unity, rather 
than duality, to be emphasized). In other words, meta-
physics remains separate from psychology as a science, 
but it is also positively required as the latter’s founda-
tion.92 
In line with such a perspective, in § 3 of Medical Psy-
chology, which is devoted to “the objections of materi-
alism”, Lotze asks for the development of a “philosophi-
cal science of nature”, “though”, he goes to on say, “our 
times hardly favor it”93. As he conceives it, such a science 
would be significantly different from the idealist “phi-
losophy of nature” (Naturphilosophie) that had been 
mainly responsible for the rejection of any philosophy of 
nature among natural scientists.94 From Lotze’s perspec-
tive, philosophy of nature in Schelling’s sense has, so to 
speak, made the mistake of projecting the intuitive mode 
of knowledge, i.e., the cognitio rei, onto the investigation 
of natural phenomena and their relationships.95 In Lotze’s 
view, two things are clear in the end: if philosophers who 
hold “theories of identity” have incorrectly introduced too 
much metaphysics into natural science, materialists 
somehow do not have enough of it. Though they seem to 
reject metaphysics altogether (even where metaphysics 
should be allowed namely, as a basis for natural science), 
one could contend that materialists smuggle it in either 
without acknowledging it, or even by doing so uncon-
sciously. 
On Lotze’s account, materialism is in fact a 
 
fragmentary and naturalistic metaphysics, which luxuriously 
proliferates wherever people believe they have freed themselves 
from all metaphysics, and to be standing firm upon the soil of 
experience and natural-scientific intuition.96 
 
It is when facing such a “denial of metaphysics” that “a 
metaphysics that expressly wishes to be one […] will al-
ways accomplish more and even be more beneficial in its 
one-sidedness than the former fragmentary and natu-
ralistic metaphysics”. Above all, this “philosophical sci-
ence of nature”, which Lotze is already working out in 
these chapters, has the virtue of critically assessing the 
connection between metaphysics and natural science in 
itself, whereas materialists fail to do so. Indeed, the rejec-
tion of metaphysics can be a laudable philosophical op-
tion too: yet, it still has to be justified and the whole issue 
cannot be ignored.  
In conclusion, then, I have to go back to the quotation 
I began with: when stating in the same sentence how little 
regard Lotze has for the materialist stance of his time and 
how influential it became all the same, he ascribes this to 
the “continuous decline in general culture”97. I am rather 
inclined to think that not only does this diagnosis still ap-
ply to us today, but that it applies, most of all, to the 
ability to discuss the very connection between metaphys-
ics and science. 
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16 Cf. Beiser, Late German Idealism, p. 244.  
17 Ibid., p. 239. 
18 Ibid.; and p. 252. As a matter of fact, Microcosmos enjoyed abiding 
success until the 1920s. It is impossible, however, to restrict Lotze’s 
place in “German intellectual history” to this work alone and to the top-
ics discussed therein. Another very remarkable element which accounts 
for Lotze’s philosophical influence is his interpretation of Plato’s ideas 
in his 1874 Logic (Logik. Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen 
und vom Erkennen, Leipzig, Hirzel, 1874, III, 2, “Die Ideenwelt”, 
pp.498-512), where he distinguishes between four meanings of “reality” 
or “effectivity” (Wirklichkeit), including in particular the concept of “va-
lidity” or “being valid” (Geltung, gelten: pp. 499-503, 507, 509). From a 
broader perspective, Lotze’s ideal-realism is not primarily “anthropol-
ogy-based”: on the contrary, one could state that the working out of a 
philosophical anthropology only becomes relevant against the meta-
physical backdrop of ideal-realism, which was first developed from an 
epistemological perspective. As such, the speculative aspects have 
played a significant part, in Lotze’s system, in trying to connect “ideal-
ist” and “realist” lines of thought in 19th century German philosophy.  
19 See below, fn. 22. About Lotze’s Medicinische Psychologie and its 
place within the psychology of his time see Beiser, Late German Ideal-
ism, pp. 211-229; William Woodward, Hermann Lotze. An Intellectual 
Biography, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015, chap. 8, pp. 202-
227 [hereafter: Woodward]; Pester, pp. 187-199.  
20 Cf. fn. 7. 
21 Pester, p. 225. 
22 That is, the three contributions to Wagner’s Handbuch der Physiolo-
gie, see above, fn. 11. The first one had been especially important, and 
Wagner placed it in the introductory part of the volume because of his 
general theoretical meaning and the importance of the issue at that time 
for the scientific debate about what the guiding principles of a scientific 
explanation of living phenomena should be: Allgemeine Pathologie 
(1842); Allgemeine Physiologie (1851); Medicinische Psychologie, 
1852, cf. above, fn. 12. 
23 MPs, p. 65. 
24 This point is underlined at the beginning of the three first paragraphs: 
MPs, “On true and false unity”, p. 22; “The materialists’ objections”, 
p.30; “The identity of the real and the ideal”, p. 45. See also p. 27. 
25 MPs, p. 22. Lotze’s emphasis. 
26 “Selbstanzeige der Medizinischen Psychologie oder Physiologie der 
Seele, Leipzig 1852” [hereafter: SA MPs], 1852; KS III, pp. 4-5. Ac-
cording to Lotze, this “passion” is even stronger in the case of material-
ism than in identity-philosophies: “The ambiguous methodological de-
mand for a unity of the principle has been expressed in no theories more 
passionately than in the materialist ones […]” (MPs, p. 30). Identity-
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philosophies, at least, see this unity in the constant combination of “ideal 
and real” (SA MPs, p. 5) 
27 MPs, pp. 28-29. On this line of reasoning cf. Denis Seron, “Lotze et la 
psychologie physiologique”, in Lotze et son héritage. Son influence et 
son impact sur la philosophie du XXe siècle, ed. Federico Boccaccini, 
Bruxelles/Bern, Peter Lang, pp. 25-26. 
28 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, “Appendix to the transcendental Dia-
lectic”, ed. P. Guyer, A. W. Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press [hereafter: Cambridge], 1998, p. 591; AA III, 428, B 673; Cam-
bridge p. 593, AA III, 430, B 675. As is well-known, this leads Kant to 
posit the three principles of sameness, of variety and (the law) of the 
affinity of all concepts (Cambridge p. 598; AA III, 428; B 685). Kant 
applies these principles to different orders of phenomena that can be 
studied scientifically. As for Lotze, he applies them to the problem ad-
dressed in this first chapter of the Medical psychology, and bearing upon 
the question as to whether we need only one or two separate principles 
to explain physical and psychic phenomena. Then he would rely on the 
second of Kant’s principles, the principle of variety that “limits in turn 
this inclination to unanimity" and thus counterbalances the first principle 
of homogeneity. (Cambridge p. 599; AA III, 437; B 688).  
29 Ibid., p. 591; AA III, 428; B 672. 
30 Yet, not only Lotze says absolutely nothing about the transcendental 
aspect of Kant’s principles; he also avoids the specific vocabulary re-
lated to it: “ideas”, “regulative use”. 
31 MPs, p. 30. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Cf. Kurt Bayertz, “Was ist moderner Materialismus?” in WPN-1, 
pp.50-70; “Dépasser la philosophie par la science. Le matérialisme natu-
raliste en Allemagne au XIXè siècle” in Morel, pp. 73-77. 
34 MPs, p. 30; see also p. 34, where Lotze denounces “the most adven-
turous outgrowths of this false enthusiasm for natural science”. Lotze 
also speaks of “passion” (Leidenschaft): see below, quotation p. 93. See 
also at the beginning of § 4, “The identity of the real and the ideal”, 
p.45: “a one-sided fascination with the principles of natural science and 
its mechanistic bend”. 
35 According to Lotze, this is one of the two “foundations” of the materi-
alist position. But later on, in the text, he does not insist much on the 
second one: “a clear polemic against any attempt to grant any aesthetic 
or moral requirements of the spirit an influence on the shaping of our 
scientific views”: ibid., p. 35.  
36 Ibid., p. 40. 
37 Spinoza, Ethics, book I, appendix. 
38 Cf. Kurt Bayertz, “Dépasser la philosophie par la science. Le matéria-
lisme naturaliste en Allemagne au XIXè siècle”, in Morel, p. 76, p. 78. 
39 Cf. end of the previous quotation p. 93; “Seele und Seelenleben”, KS I, 
p. 7. 
40 MPs, p. 11-13; “Seele und Seelenleben”, p. 7. See Beiser commenting 
on this point: Late German Idealism, p. 218; Woodward, pp. 110-111, 
114, 196. 
41 “Seele und Seelenleben”, KS II, p. 1; see also: self-advertising abstract 
of Medicinische Psychologie, KS I, p. 5. 
42 MPs, p. 14. See also p. 38 and p. 43: “[...] to have recognized that 
these two circles of processes don’t communicate”; “psychical appear-
ances are not identical or analogous to physical ones” (Lotze’s empha-
sis). 
43 Ibid., p. 30-31. See also p. 32: “We need not give up the view accord-
ing to which psychical and physical processes can be explained by a 
common domain of laws; but naturally this domain lies beyond both 
members of this opposition, and the truth will not be found if we apply 
the laws that are valid for the one member in view of its special nature, 
to another whose specific quality is entirely divergent, although this one 
may fall under the same general concept.” 
44 Ibid., p. 29: “We must admit the diversity of these substrata as soon as 
the difference between these phenomena demands it as imperiously as in 
the present case, i.e. studying life of the soul”. 
45 “Recension von Karl Snell, Die Streitfrage des Materialismus. Ein 
vermittelndes Wort. (Jena 1858)” (Göttinginsche gelehrte Anzeigen, 
1859, n°104, p. 1026-1035; KS III, pp. 349-355; here p. 353).  
46 Ibid. 
47 MPs, p. 24, end of § 13. 
48 Ibid., p. 45. 
49 Ibid., p. 56: “In the course of life we are so used to sensual intuitions, 
that that which is most obscure --merely present, passive, inert stuff-- 
appears to us the most clear […]. This exclusive belief in the sensual, 
this confidence in its exclusive reality, whose expressions face us in 
every corner of the scientific world, constitutes, in our time, springing 
forth from many sources, such a great and imposing current of error 
[…]”.  
 
 
50 Heinrich Czolbe will take this point very seriously and try to reply in 
his New presentation of sensualism by elaborating a “construction of 
matter” (as Lotze calls it): Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus, II, chap. 
1, “Materie und Raum”, II, chap. 1; Lotze, review of Heinrich Czolbe, 
1855, KS III, p. 248). Lotze gives a (very) critical account of this elabo-
ration in the next to last page of his review of Czolbe’s book (ibid., p. 
249).  
51 MPs, p. 31.  
52 Cf. Microcosmos, I, chapters 2 to 4. Also the previous essay “Leben, 
Lebenskraft” provides the reader with an accurate analysis of the con-
cept of force (Kraft) that backs up Lotze’s rejection of the vital force 
theory: KS I, p. 153-159. 
53 Cf. Reinhardt p, op. cit., pp. 219-227. 
54 Review of Gustav Fechner, Über die physikalische und philoso-
phische Atomenlehre (Leipzig 1855), KS III, pp. 215-238. See Pester’s 
summary in the pages referred to just above, as well as Beiser, p. 236. 
55 MPs, p. 61-62. 
56 MPs, p. 57. See also p. 56.  
57 Ibid., p. 60. 
58 Within the context of the materialism controversy, this appears clearly 
in the review of August Weber’ book, Die neueste Vergötterung des 
Stoffes. Ein Blick in das Leben der Natur und des Geistes. Für denkende 
Leser (1856); KS III, pp. 294-303: cf. notably, pp. 295-297; see also the 
review of Czolbe’s book (see above, fn. 50; review of Czolbe 1855, pp. 
248-249). 
59 About this metaphysical approach to matter: see MPs, pp. 61-62. 
60 The self-advertising abstract of Medical Psychology, KS III, p. 5. 
61 See for instance what we noted above about Czolbe, p. 91: the shift 
from anti-vitalism to materialism is a good example of the extent to 
which inaccuracy affects the very possibility of addressing the right 
topic in the controversy.  
62 In addition to his review of Czolbe’s book, Neue Darstellung des Sen-
sualismus (New presentation of sensualism), Lotze wrote a second re-
view for a text which Czolbe addressed to him directly: cf. review of 
Heinrich Czolbe, Entstehung des Selbstbewusstseins. Eine Antwort an 
Herrn Prof. Lotze (Leipzig 1856); KS III, pp. 315-320).—On Lotze and 
Czolbe see Beiser, Late German Idealism, pp. 246-249; Beiser, After 
Hegel, pp. 84-89; Woodward, pp. 212-213; Hedwig Breilmann, Lotzes 
Stellung zum Materialismus, unter besonderer Besichtigung seiner Con-
troverse mit Czolbe, Inaugural-Dissertation, Münster, 1925.  
63 See above, (2): this is the title of § 1 in Medical Psychology: cf. MPs, 
p. 9; pp. 15-18; “Seele und Seelenleben”, KS II, pp. 4-19. 
64 Review of Czolbe 1855, p. 244. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., p. 243. 
67 On Lotze’s being aware of Kant on this matter cf. Beiser, After Hegel, 
p. 86; Woodward, p. 212, Beiser, Late German Idealism, pp. 223-229, 
“A Kantian Psychology”. 
68 Lotze contrasts this term with the only cognitive principle in Czolbe’s 
sensualism: “Anschauung”, which here means the intuitive knowledge 
of the sensory world. 
69 Review of Czolbe 1855, p. 240. 
70 Ibid., p. 245. 
71 See also Beiser, Late German Idealism, pp. 219-220: does Lotze ad-
mit ontological dualism? –The philologist Friedrich Max Müller, who 
attended Lotze’s philosophical circle in Göttingen (and who later be-
came a major specialist in Sanskrit philology) reports that, on these oc-
casions, the young Lotze was mostly interested in Kant’s texts: “Most of 
all, we used to read and to discuss Kant’s Critique” (F. M. Müller, Aus 
meinem Leben. Fragmente zu einer Selbstbiographie, Gotha, Perthes, 
1902, p. 115; quoted by Pester, p. 103). See also Reinhard Pester’s valu-
able article of Lotze and Kant: “Lotzes Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neu-
kantianismus”, Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Interna-
tionalen Kant-Kongresses, Berlin - New York 2001, n° 193, vol. 5, 
pp.297-397. 
72 By echoing Czolbe’s own terms in the New Exposition of Sensualism, 
Lotze speaks of a “suprasensible content” (übersinnlicher Inhalt)—an 
expression, which does not help clarify his relation to Kant. Cf. review 
of Czolbe 1855, pp. 240-141, for example: “thus whenever we in gen-
eral call something a thing, we are again adding something supersensual 
to the inventory of intuition”.—In his second Logic in 1874, however, 
Lotze directly uses the term “Apriorismus”. 
73 Cf. review of Czolbe 1855, p. 239. 
74 See Pester’s summary of this issue: Pester, pp. 191-192; and in par-
ticular this passage from Lotze’s review of Ottomar Domrich: Die psy-
chischen Zustände, ihre organische Vermittelung und ihre Wirkung in 
Erzeugung körperlicher Krankheiten. Jena 1849, KS II, p. 451 (quota-
tion also by Pester, p. 193): “The assumption of the soul as a characteris-
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tic principle of [physical] effects [stands] for me, or for anyone who 
shares my opinions in this matter, not in an indivisible connection with 
the need to somehow salvage the immortality or freedom of the human 
spirit, [but rather] it only comes from the theoretical demands for an 
explanation of the psychological facts […].” (Lotze’s emphasis); “in-
deed, through this presupposition it did not occur to me to replace theo-
retical principles of explanation with theological articles of faith, but I 
make it because the immanent need for the explanation of psychological 
explanations demands it.” (ibid.) 
75 MPs, pp. 32-33. See also the following paragraph (p. 34; see below in 
this article, fn. 86): the passage is directly lifted from the review of Ot-
tomar Domrich, slightly modified in order to fit the new context: see the 
review of Ottomar Domrich, KS II, pp. 449-450; quoted and commented 
on by Pester, p. 192. 
76 See the important passage characterizing the soul as a “phenomenol-
ogical expression” both in the 1844 article on “Instinkt” (KS I, p. 239) 
and in the 1846 “Seele und Seelenleben” (KS II, p. 18: “Consequently, 
the term ‘soul’ does not designate for us any kind of separate genus of 
substance, opposed to other genera, rather it is only a phenomenological 
expression, and means every substrate that is moreover unknown to us, 
insofar as it is capable of bringing forth the indicated phenomena.” But 
the argument accounting for the “physical-mental mechanism” from 
“Leben, Lebenskraft (1842) sounded quite differently: in fact, there the 
soul is directly referred to as a substance (KS I, p. 191; cf. also fn. 78). 
In relation to such appeal to the concept of substance in order to refer to 
the soul, Georg Misch tries to make things clearer by pointing out that it 
applies only at some intermediate levels in the system: cf. Georg Misch, 
“Einleitung”, in his edition of Lotze’s Logic, Logik. Drei Bücher, vom 
Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen, Leipzig, Meiner, 1912, 
p.L-LI. 
77 On this central idea (from which it follows that Lotze’s physiological 
psychology rests upon basis different from Fechner’s and Wundt’s) cf. 
Denis Seron, art. cit., p. 30 sq.; Woodward, pp. 202-227 (“The Physical-
Mental Mechanism: An Alternative to Psychophysics”). Lotze, MPs, 
book 1, chap. 2: “On physical-mental mechanism”; Mikrokosmos, book 
III, chap. 1, “Der Zusammenhang zwischen Leib und Seele”. 
78 I assume that we have indeed exactly the same kind of reasoning in 
the passage about the soul in “Leben, Lebenskraft”, which the previous 
footnote refers to. If we consider Lotze’s whole line of reasoning, even 
in the case where the soul is referred to as a substance (this being a non-
Kantian thesis), I would tend to highlight the implicit reference to 
Kant’s categories of relation: a substance – not only an idea – being 
necessary in order to be able to speak of a causal relations (what is a 
stake is in the end the interaction – Wechselwirkung: “reciprocity” in the 
action – between several substances). 
79 Cf. my paper: “Descartes et Leibniz, deux modèles pour dépasser le 
matérialisme au 19e siècle: un parcours dans la philosophie du jeune 
Lotze”, in Les âges classiques du 19è siècle, dir. Delphine Antoine-
Mahut, Stéphane Zékian, Paris, soon to be published by Éditions des 
archives contemporaines.  
80 MPs, p. 61. 
81 Ibid., pp. 55-56. My emphasis. 
82 MPs, p. 57. About this distinction: Pester, pp. 188-189; Beiser, Late 
German Idealism, p. 217, and the beginning of chapter 2 in MPs, pp. 66-
69.  
83 MPs, p. 57. 
84 Cf. Georg Misch, “Die Idee der Lebensphilosophie in der Theorie der 
Geisteswissenschaften”, in Kant-Studien, 31, n° 1-3, January 1926, 
p.546. See also Helmut Plessner, Macht Und Menschliche Natur. Ein 
Versuch zur Anthropologie der geschichtlichen Weltsicht, Berlin, Junker 
& Dünnhaupt, 1931, p. 180. Nevertheless, Ernst W. Orth emphasizes 
that the terminological difference between erklären and verstehen is not 
already as significant for Lotze as it will be for Dilthey (“Psyche and 
Psychologie bei Rudolph Hermann Lotze”, in Grenzen der kritischen 
Vernunft. Helmut Holzhey zum Geburtstag, eds. Peter A. Schmid, Si-
mone Zurbuchen Basel, Schwabe, 1997, p. 125).  
85 MPs, p. 24-25. My emphasis, except for the last word (Lotze’s em-
phasis). 
86 Ibid., p. 34: “We would only be required to make our fundamental 
principles of natural science still more general, to cleanse them still 
more of the specific components that are valid only for determinate 
classes of *material substrata*, and to assimilate them to a general stat-
ics and mechanics that is related not simply to motions, but also to 
changes in general, not only to masses, but to beings.” (ibid.).This pas-
sage (including the preceding lines: see above, fn. 75) is taken from a 
review which Lotze write for a book by Ottomar Domrich: KS II, 
pp.449-450. Lotze only made one change that I have marked with aster-
 
 
isks here: “materieller Substrate” instead of ”Wesen” in the previous 
version.  
87 Kant, Critique of Pure reason, Cambridge, p. 598 (AA III, 435; B 
685). 
88 Ibid., p. 600 (AA III, 438; B 690). 
89 Ibid., p. 603 (AA III, 440; B 694). 
90 Ibid., p. 599-600 (AA III, 437; B 688). My emphasis. 
91 From the perspective of the “Appendix to the transcendental Dialec-
tic”, we would be facing the case where the answer to the question as to 
“the constitution of the object” “lies too deeply hidden for [anyone] to 
be able to speak from an insight into [its] nature” (ibid., p. 604, my 
translation, AA III, p. 441; B 695). 
92 In this respect, I refer to the end of the first part: we must also con-
tinue to ask ourselves why this foundation should be a metaphysical one, 
whereas a transcendental solution would have been possible as well. 
93 MPs, § 3, p. 32.  
94 Cf. Lotze, review of C. W. Stark’s Allgemeine Pathologie, KS I, p. 27: 
“Mostly it is Schelling’s Naturphilosophie that hindered physiology for 
a long time….], quoted by Woodward, p. 50; Pester, p. 81. 
95 In § 4 in particular (“The identity of the real and the ideal”), Lotze 
develops this very criticism after his critique of the materialist approach 
in § 3: the identity philosophies which had as their aim to explain nature 
on the basis of its undifferentiated unity with spirit have therefore de-
prived themselves of the only possible means for investigating the (spa-
tio-temporal) conditioned relationships that take place between natural 
elements: mechanism. (MPs, pp. 45-46; p. 49). 
96 Ibid., § 3, p. 32.  
97 See the excerpt already quoted above, p. 91: “The great extension that 
these materialistic reasonings have won in the progressive decline of 
general education, and surely will continue to win, requires us, without 
the hope of meaningful success, to test out […] their salient argu-
ments.”(MPs, p. 30) 
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